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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which found 
him guilty by a jury trial of violation of Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On April 14 and 15, 19 76, appellant was tried and 
convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Annotated as amended in 19 75. He was sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of five years to life 
in prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant petitions the court to hold Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Annotated as amended in 19 75, unconstitutional as 
applied to this plaintiff and to vacate and reverse the District 
Court judgment or, in the alternative, to declare a mistrial and 
remand the case for further proceedings or, in the alternative, 
to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
robbery under Section 76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 22nd day of July, 1975, Jerry Graham was robbed 
at Dan's Foodtown at 70th South and Highland Drive, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. On July 22, 1975, appellant was arrested 
in connection with the robbery, identified by Mr. Graham as the 
assailant and on July 23, 1975, a complaint was filed accusing 
the appellant of aggravated robbery in violation of Section 
76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended in 1975. Trial 
by jury was held on April 14 and 15, 1976. After presentation 
of all the evidence, the following six instructions were given 
to the jury: 
"Instruction No. 8: Under the law of the 
State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in the 
possession of another from his or her person, 
or immediate presence, against the will of that 
person, which taking is accomplished by means 
of force or fear. 
A person commits an aggravated robbery, which 
is a first degree felony, if, in the course of 
committing a robbery, that person uses a deadly 
weapon. A deadly weapon means anything that in 
the manner of its use or intended use is likely 
to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
Under the law, an act of using a deadly weapon 
is deemed to be 'in the course of committing a 
robbery,' as that phrase is used in these instruc-
tions, if the use of a deadly weapon occurs in an 
attempt to commit, or during the commission of a 
robbery. 
One acts 'unlawfully,1 in the taking of 
personal property in the possession of another, as 
used in these instructions if the actor takes such 
property wrongfully, without rights or permission 
and with the deliberate intent to commit a crime. 
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Under the law, one acts intentionally or 
with intent with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or as a result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or to cause the result. 
Intent with which an act is done denotes a 
state of mind and connotes purpose in so acting. 
Intent, being a state of mind, is not always 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence 
and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
"Instruction No. 9: You are instructed that 
a firearm is not a deadly weapon unless it is loaded. 
The Utah Code defines when a weapon is deemed to have 
been loaded in 76-10-502, but if from the evidence 
you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the 
gun testified to in this case was loaded, you must 
find the defendant not guilty of aggravated robbery 
and consider the lesser included offense of robbery." 
"Instruction No. 10: You are instructed that 
for the purposes of this case, that a "dangerous 
weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use 
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. In construing whether an item, object 
or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is 
a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, 
object or thing; the character of the wound produced, 
if any; and the manner in which the instrument, 
object, or thing was used shall be determinative. 
'Firearms' means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off 
rifle and/or any device that could be used as a 
weapon from which is expelled a projective by any 
force." 
"Instruction No. 11: You are instructed that 
facsimile is defined as: An exact and precise copy 
of anything. An exact reproduction, for example, the 
signature reproduced by rubber stamp." 
"Instruction No. 12: You are further instructed 
that a facsimile of a firearm is any instrument that 
by its appearance resembles a firearm." 
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"Instruction No. 13: Before you can convict 
the defendant of the crime of aggravated robbery, 
as charged in the Information, you must find from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 22nd day of July, 19 75, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Steven Craig Turner, unlawfully and intentionally 
took money or property from Jerry Graham. 
2. That said property or money was in the 
possession or immediate presence of Jerry Graham. 
3. That the taking of said money or property 
from Jerry Graham was accomplished by means of 
force or fear. 
4. That in the course of taking said money or 
property the defendant, Steven Craig Turner, used a 
deadly weapon consisting of a firearm or a facsimile 
of a firearm. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes 
each and all of the essential elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict 
the defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence has 
failed to so establish one or more of said elements 
then you should find the defendant not guilty of 
aggravated robbery and then consider the lesser 
included offense of robbery in accordance with the 
following instruction." 
Closing arguments were then heard and the jury 
began its deliberations. After the jury had left the courtroom, 
time was granted by the bench to except to the instructions. 
The State indicated it had no objections. Appellant objected 
to the above recited instructions (T.123-4) on the grounds that 
the instructions were confusing and conflicting and further 
objected to the statute as being unconstitutionally vague. 
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POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
SECTION 76-6-302 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS AMENDED IN 
19 75, IS VOID BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO 
APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. 
Section 76-6-302 insofar as it is pertinent to this 
case reads as follows: 
11
 (1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a fire-
arm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; 
The complaint under which appellant was charged reads: 
"That the said Steven Craig Turner, at the time and 
place aforesaid, robbed Jerry Graham, and in so doing, 
used a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun or facsimile 
thereof;" (R.8) 
The complaint charged defendant with using a gun or facsimile 
thereof and that it was a deadly weapon. Although the complaint 
reads in accordance with the statute, the difficulty in this case 
arose when the court attempted to interpret the word "facsimile". 
The term "facsimile" has been defined in a very few 
dissertations on the law, but it does appear at least twice as 
follows: 
"FACSIMILE. An exact copy, preserving all the 
marks of the original." (Blacks Law Dictionary; 
35 C.J.S.) 
The common meaning of the word as given in Websters 
New Unabridged Dictionary, Second Addition, is the same: 
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"1. Act of making a copy, imitation. 
2. An exact and detailed copy of anything, 
as of a book, document, painting, or statute;" 
Syn. See duplicate. (emphasis added) 
Appellantfs research has produced no case law that 
defines the term. One case has defined the word "imitation": 
"The word 'imitation1 when applied to pistols and 
revolvers means so nearly resembling the genuine 
as to mislead." People v. Delgardo, 146 N.Y.S. 2d 
350 at 356; 1 Misc 2d 821 (1955) (Emphasis added) 
From the above, it is clear then that the term 
"facsimile" means "an exact copy" whether one examines the common 
meaning or the legal meaning and that even an imitation means the 
same. In People v. Delgarda, supra, the court went on to use 
examples of cap guns and water pistols. Clearly the evidence 
in this case does not even approach the meaning of these words. 
Mr. Graham testified that he saw an inch to an inch and a half 
of a hollow tube: (T. 10 and T.22) 
"Q. Now, you indicated you saw about an inch 
and a half of a gun pointing out of a shirt, is that 
what you stated? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you explain to me what you mean 
pointing out of his shirt? 
A He had his hand under the barrel, was just 
up under his shirt. All I could see of the shirt 
down over it was an inch and a half of the barrell. 
Q. Did the barrel have a sight on? 
A No, just a round, short — 
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"Q. Sure it wasn't a piece of pipe? 
A. I don't believe it to be, no. 
Q. Very polished? Well, how did he have his 
hand in his shirt with the gun poking out? 
A. He just had it under his shirt with his 
gun stuck under coming out here. (Indicating.) 
And he was toward me this way so I couldn't see 
how he had his hand. 
Q. Was his shirt tucked in? 
A. Yes. It was. 
Q. Well, all you saw was something shiny and 
round without a sight on it, is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You're sure you didn't give the police 
any further description of what you've told us 
here today? 
A. No. Not that I recall at this time, no.11 
In its jury instructions the court expanded the meaning 
of the term "facsimile" well beyong its proper meaning. 
Instruction #12 reads: 
"You are further instructed that a facsimile 
of a firearm is any instrument that by its 
appearance resembles a firearm." 
When Instruction 12 is read with Instruction 11, which requires 
that a facsimile be an "exact and precise copy", it is clear that 
Instruction 12 opens the door to a vast area of definition and 
interpretation. In effect, Instruction 12 cancels and eliminates 
the need for Instruction 11 and the jury might be persuaded by 
something other than an exact duplicate. 
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When Instruction 12 is read together with Instruction 9 
the vagueness is even more pronounced. In Instruction 9 the courl 
instructs the jury that they must find that the gun was loaded, 
while in Instruction 12, the object need not even be a gun and 
no instruction indicates that the facsimile need be dangerous or 
deadly, but need only resemble, in some unknown way, a gun. 
Clearly, the instructions have so distorted the meaning of the 
words of the statute that they have no meaning whatsoever. As 
applied in this case, the statute is vague and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
The statute must give fair notice of what is prohibited 
People v. Barksdale, 105 Cal. Rptr 1, 8C3d 320, 503 P.2d 257 
(1972); People v. Carcia, 541 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1975); People v. 
Gonzales, 534 P.2d 626 (Colo. 1975); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 
503 P.2d 176 (1972); Hildahl v. State, 536 P.2d 1298 (Okl. Cr. Ct 
1975) ; Combs v. State, 536 P.2d 373 (Okl. Cr. Ct. 1975); State v. 
Martinez, 85 Wash. 2d 671, 538 P.2d 521 (1975); Blondheim v. Stat 
84 Wash. 2d 874; 529 P.2d 1096 (1975); State v. Packard, 122 Ut. 
369; 250 P.2d 561. The instructions in this case leave absolute] 
no standard as to the meaning of the word facsimile. The object 
could have been a three-inch piece of rubber tubing painted grey 
gray plastic tubing or any number of things that are neither deac 
or dangerous and still appellant could have been convicted of ag< 
vated robbery. Furthermore, under the jury instructions in this 
case the entire object need not resemble a gun. Mr. Graham only 
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saw one inch of the object and that inch only looked like part 
of a gun, yet appellant was convicted. 
Appellant submits that the District Court's instruc-
tions so changed the meaning of the statute as to leave it vague 
and uncertain, and therefore unconstitutional, as applied to 
appellant. 
POINT II 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE DISTRICT COURT ARE 
CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY. 
1. Instruction number 8 defines a deadly weapon in 
the following manner: 
"A deadly weapon means anything that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is likely 
to cause death or serious bodily injury." 
(emphasis added) 
Instruction 8 requires the jury to find that a deadly 
weapon, as defined in the instruction, was used by appellant. It 
will be observed that the instruction defines a deadly weapon in 
terms of the probability of its causing death. 
The court then gives Instruction 10 on dangerous 
weapons: 
"...a 'dangerous weapon' means any item that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. " "~ 
Although Instruction 10 is appellant's instruction, appellant 
submits that the two instructions together are conflicting, 
contradictory and confusing. 
Having the capacity to kill is a more expansive defi-
nition than having the likelihood of killing. In no instruction 
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does the court explain the difference in the two terms, even 
after appellant's objection that the two instructions were 
contradictory. It is entirely possible for the jury to have 
found appellant guilty on the more comprehensive definition 
than on the meaning of the term "deadly weapon", the term 
appeallant was charged with. It was possible for the jury to 
have been confused with both terms and assumed them to have 
been the same. Taken together, the two definitions are con-
fusing and erroneous. State v. Hendricks, 123 Ut. 267, 
258 P.2d 452 (1951); State v. Wheeler, 70 Id. 455, 220 P.2d 
687 (1948) . 
2. Instruction 8 requires the appellant to have used 
a deadly weapon. Instruction 9 requires that if the object 
used was a gun that it had to be loaded before it could be 
classified as a deadly weapon and that if the gun was not 
loaded the jury could not find appellant guilty of aggravated 
robbery. Instruction 10 then defines a dangerous weapon. 
Without an explanation as to the reason for the use of the 
definition the jury could then believe that this third defi-
nition would also suffice to convict. Instruction 12 then 
defines facsimile in broad terms and does not require that a 
facsimile be loaded, dangerous or deadly, nor does it require 
that the facsimile be likely or capable of causing death. In 
essence then, the jury now has a fourth reason, separate and 
distinct from the first three, to convict. Finally, 
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Instruction 13 is given which leaves the impression that a gun 
or facsimile of a gun is per se a deadly weapon. The instruc-
tions, therefore, have left the jury with at least five 
possible methods of convicting, all contradictory, and appel-
lant is the recipient of the effects. State v. Hendricks, 
supra; State v. Wheeler, supra. 
3. It should be pointed out that the complaint charged 
appellant with use of a deadly weapon and that the deadly 
weapon was a gun or facsimile of a gun. The instructions, 
however, expand the complaint to include the ones other than 
a deadly gun. It is contrary to law to expand the theory of 
law beyond the limits of the complaint in the instructions. 
State v. Anderson, 100 Ut. 468, 116 P.2d 398. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 76-6-302 as applied in this case is unconsti-
tutional. The instructions given to the jury were contra-
dictory, confusing and over-expansive and, therefore, erroneous 
and contrary to law. Appellant, therefore, submits that this 
court should reverse the lower court's decision or, in the 
alternative, find the defendant guilty of the lesser included 
offense of robbery under Section 76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
Respectfully submitted. 
0>
" SUMNER J J HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Mr. 
Mr. Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, 2 36 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this 
17th day of February, 1977. 
) <: 
/ '•&.7.J, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
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